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We design a multiple project-funding contract that provides optimal incentives to
recipients, in a setting where externalities exist among the multiple projects and where
donors and recipients may diﬀer in their valuation of the projects.
To do so, we study optimal incentive payments in a dynamic principal-agent frame-
work with focus on two-project contracts. The principal cannot observe the agent’s
investment, but only completed projects. We consider principals that cannot commit
to contract termination before completion of the projects; we assume that the contract
does not end until both projects are accomplished.
We derive the optimal contract for each possible combination of principal-agent-
project characteristics to ﬁnd that projects should be undertaken simultaneously when
value externalities among them are large, i.e. when completing both projects gives the
recipient signiﬁcantly more utility than the sum of the projects’ independent values.
The principal’s utility maximizing strategy, when technical externalities among projects
are important, is a sequential contract that starts with the project that generates the
externality.
We ﬁnd that diﬀerences in project valuation between agents and recipients may,
in some cases, lead to ineﬃcient contracts, when in other situations the ability of the
principal to choose the timing of the project competition may be a safety clause for
him.
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1I n t r o d u c t i o n
What should multiple project foreign aid contracts look like? How should incentives be
provided to managers when multiple projects must be completed and managers are speciﬁc
to these projects? Principals in both settings share a commitment problem: due to their
Samaritan’s dilemma and speciﬁcities in the relationship, whatever the outcome of invest-
ment in each period, they cannot commit to abandoning the contract. Moreover, agents in
these settings share a special characteristic: they value the projects to be completed.
The questions we attempt to answer are as follows. First, what is the optimal timing to
complete the projects? Second, what is the optimal transfer scheme between the principal
and agent in the framework of multiple, related projects? And third, what is the impact of
the principal’s and agent’s preferences over the projects, in equilibrium, on the eﬃciency of
the contract provided?
We study, in a dynamic principal-agent framework, the optimal incentive payments
and timing of two projects, and how both technical characteristics of the projects and the
preferences of principals and agents aﬀect the optimal contract.
Both foreign aid donors and shareholders face a moral hazard problem: the use of funds
by the recipient country/manager is not observable by the donor/shareholder. In extant
foreign aid literature, conditionality of aid is the most commonly proposed solution to the
misallocation of resources problem1. However, conditionality introduces a commitment
problem: even if the conditions are not met, the donors want to alleviate the lot of the
poor, and so they give the aid anyway; the recipients will anticipate this behavior2.F o r
example, Dreher (2002)3 states that the World Bank has almost never cancelled a program,
even if non-compliance is evident. By further example, when ﬁrms expand to new markets,
local knowledge may require managers to be utilized speciﬁcally for the relationship, and
t h et h r e a to fﬁring the manager would imply the end of business in that area, beyond the
projects involved in the contract.
We present a contract that accounts for the principal’s commitment problem by not
allowing for cancellation of the contract before the projects are completed. This requires
that the contract proposed have an indeterminate length. We assume that the principal
1Drazen (1999), Svenson (2000, 2003), and Azam and Laﬀont (2003), among others, present models that
"condition" aid ﬂows on a given performance, a degree of political and economic change, or on a deﬁned
consumption level for the poorest people in the recipient country, respectively.
2Easterly (2001).
3Killick (1998), Dreher (2002) and The World Bank (2005) present reviews of the literature and examples
of time inconsistency involving conditional aid contracts.3
can commit to a sequence of transfers for each possible history of successes and failures of
the projects, but not to cut the ﬂow of funds before all projects are accomplished.
Given that multiple actions must be undertaken, it is necessary to establish appropriate
timing for the completion of each project: either simultaneous or sequential, in any possible
order. This intervention timing is a key element in the contract design. On the one hand,
the projects may inﬂuence one another, and the timing of each project determines these
inﬂuences. On the other hand, donor and principal priorities may not be aligned. This
misalignment of preferences may have both positive and negative eﬀects on the eﬃcacy of
the contract provided, depending on how welfare is deﬁned.
In the foreign aid example, pressures for global vertical ﬁnancing and strong donor pref-
erence towards certain projects create a scenario in which, though aid is required, the aid
package oﬀered by the donor may not be optimal from the perspective of the recipient coun-
try. Both the Rome Declaration on Aid Harmonization (2003) and the Paris Declaration on
Aid Eﬀectiveness (2005) note that in order to enhance eﬀectiveness, it is necessary to ensure
that development assistance is delivered in accordance with recipient country priorities.
In the corporate ﬁnance example, shareholders’ optimal timing may not coincide with
managers’. In this case, the ability to choose the structure of the contract allows sharehold-
ers to impose their utility maximizing timing in an incentive-compatible way for managers.
To account for the multiple related actions that the contract requires for implementa-
tion, we consider a "multitask" contract that involves two projects, which require separate
investments. In the existing literature, Holmstrom and Milgrom (1991) propose a static
multitask model where the agent performs multiple tasks simultaneously. By contrast, we
propose a dynamic setting where the principal can choose the timing of each task to be
either simultaneous or sequential. When investment in a project is successful, it produces
an observable outcome: the completed project. Moreover, the implementation of the tasks
to complete it has a direct eﬀect on both the principal’s and agent’s utility, since both
value completed projects. We propose a results-oriented approach: the optimal contract is
given by a sequence of transfers after each feasible history of successes and failures in the
accomplishment of the projects that are covered by the contract.
Relative to prior literature, the novelties of this model are found in its introduction of
a multitask structure on an indeterminate-length contract, which is ﬂexible in the timing
of tasks and in the unique principal and agent preferences over the projects involved in the
contract. The agent’s valuation of the projects, together with the particular dynamics of
each timing structure, allow for high-powered incentives in each task.4
When making the investment decision, the agent compares the utility of consumption
from the transfer received with the cost of investment and the promised utilities, after each
possible realization of the investment. To provide the agent incentives to invest, we allow for
two types of "bonuses." The ﬁrst arises when he signs the contract (the participation bonus):
it is given by the diﬀerence between the utility the contract provides to the agent and his
reservation value (the agent’s utility if he does not sign the contract). This participation
bonus is derived from the agent’s valuation of the projects: even if the transfer is the
minimum feasible one, and the agent invests it, the agent gets an expected lifetime utility
greater than he would had he not signed the contract, since there is a positive probability
that the projects will be completed in the future. The agent may also receive a subsequent
project bonus when one of the projects is completed. The project bonus is the diﬀerence
between the promised utility to the agent and the minimum lifetime utility the agent can
receive on his own when only one of the projects has been completed.
To derive the optimal contract, the principal compares costs and beneﬁts for each fea-
sible timing structure (simultaneous or sequential completion). We ﬁnd that the cheapest
contract, for either simultaneous or sequential investment, is a stationary contract that
provides the agent with the same transfer for all attempts until one of the projects is suc-
cessful. If a project rewards the agent with a project bonus, the agent receives a decreasing
sequence of promised utilities (and transfers) for successive attempts, until the remain-
ing project is completed successfully. This decreasing sequence converges to the cheapest
stationary contract.
For the agent, investment entails giving up a certain amount of consumption today
against a positive probability that the project(s) will be completed successfully tomorrow,
since from the transfer received, he decides whether to invest in one or both projects, or to
consume all of the received funds. More risk averse agents require better rewards, in the
form of project bonuses, in order to undertake the risk of investing in the projects in the
ﬁrst place. Time discounting also plays a role in determining the amount of the optimal
project bonus: the more the agent discounts the future, the more likely he is to require
project bonuses to compensate him for the delay between investment and outcome.
In considering the sequential contract, we are interested in the optimal project sequenc-
ing. When the two projects are symmetric in their costs and probabilities of success, it is
optimal to begin the sequence with the project that the agent values the most. However,
when there is a positive technical externality among projects (i.e. one project’s completion
increases the probability of success, or decreases the cost of the remaining project), it may5
be optimal to begin with the less valued project, depending on parameter values.
On the other hand, when we examine the simultaneous contract, we ﬁnd that project
bonuses are typically awarded for the project that the agent values the least. This rule
could be reversed for projects with diﬀerent investment costs or diﬀerent probabilities of
success, if these diﬀerences are signiﬁcant enough.
Comparing the two timing structures, we ﬁnd that the simultaneous contract is cheaper
than the sequential one whenever the latter would provide a transfer large enough to cover
investment in both projects. In fact, when the simultaneous investment cost is smaller than
the sum of the investment costs in each of the single projects, and when the valuation of
the last project in the sequence has little eﬀect on the joint valuation of the projects, the
principal can always design an alternative simultaneous contract that is cheaper and that
includes project bonuses. Even if the sequential contract is the cheapest alternative when
investment is observable, we show that the simultaneous contract is likely to become the
cheapest alternative when moral hazard enters the equation.
Comparing the costs and beneﬁts of the two timing alternatives, we ﬁnd that simultane-
ous is the optimal timing for the principal when valuation interactions among projects are
large, i.e., when completing both projects gives the agent signiﬁcantly more utility than the
sum of the projects’ independent values. The principal’s utility maximizing strategy, when
technical externalities are important, is a sequential contract that begins with the project
that generates that technical externality.
The structure of the paper is as follows. We begin with a description of the structure
of the model, which includes the projects’ characteristics as well as principal and agent
preferences, and we present the steps in the choice between optimal contracts. In Section
3, we present the cost minimization problem, and compare the cost minimizing contract for
both timing structures. We continue in Section 4 with a comparison of the expected beneﬁts
of each timing alternative. Finally, in Section 5, we compare sequential and simultaneous
costs and beneﬁts to derive qualitative results on the optimal contract choice for diﬀerent
projects and agents. In Section 6, we present conclusions.
2 Structure of the model
We present a dynamic moral hazard model with an indeterminate time horizon:n o
cancellation clauses are allowed until both projects are completed. The principal faces a
Samaritan’s Dilemma4: he cannot commit to stop the ﬂow of funds to the agent until both
4Term introduced by Buchanan (1975)6
projects are accomplished. A risk neutral "altruistic" principal signs a contract with a risk
averse agent who makes an unobservable investment decision.
We name the projects A and B. Let Ht = {∅,A,B,AB} be the set of possible combi-
nations of projects completed at period t, where ∅ denotes neither of the projects being
completed, and let Ht = H0 × H1 × H2 × .. × Ht be the (t +1 )product set of H. Every
element ht ∈ Ht describes the history of successes and failures in the accomplishment of
the projects up to period t. Let T 6 ∞ be the (indeterminate) end period of the contract.
The timing of events is as follows: after a given history ht, the principal transfers to
the agent τt(ht). Once he receives the transfer, the agent makes an unobservable (discrete)
investment choice It(ht). Each possible combination of projects completed, i = ∅,A,B,AB,
is realized with probability πi(It | ht). In the next period, the outcome of the investment is
realized and is observed by the principal and the agent. In case there is still one (or both)
projects to be completed, the principal transfers τt+1(ht+1) to the agent, and the contract
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Figure 1: Timing of events
A contract in this framework is given by a sequence of transfers for every possible
history of successes and failures in the accomplishment of the projects covered by the con-




t=0 conditional on the history ht
of projects completed, given that this is the only information available to the principal. In
every period, the agent chooses the investment he wants to perform, It ∈ {0,ΨA,ΨB,ΨAB},
where Ψx denotes cost of investment for x = A,B,AB. The agent decides whether not to
invest, invest in project A, in project B, or in both projects simultaneously. Given in-
vestment It(ht), the probability of i = {∅,A,B,AB} being realized is given by πi(It | ht).
Probability of success depends on the projects completed and on the agent’s investment
choice.7
We assume the principal cannot commit to abandon the contract before both projects
have been completed, but he can commit to a sequence of payments after each possible
history of success and failure in the accomplishment of the projects. In the case of managers
and shareholders, we can interpret the commitment to a sequence of transfers as a reputation
device. We present in the appendix the cheapest contract when the donor cannot commit
to a sequence of transfers, and show how the mai nr e s u l t so ft h eo p t i m a lc o n t r a c ta r en o t
aﬀected by the commitment to disbursements assumption.
2.1 Project characteristics
All technical characteristics of the projects are common information for principal and agent.
We consider two projects, project A and project B, with value for the agent5 WA and WB
respectively when only one of them is completed, and value for the agent WAB when both are
completed. The physical characteristics of the projects are such that they can be completed
either sequentially or simultaneously.
We deﬁne value interaction as the diﬀerence (WAB − WA − WB), the extra utility
that completing both projects provides over the sum of their independent values. To be
completed, each combination of projects, x = A,B,AB, requires an investment of cost Ψx
that is successful with probability πx, that depends on the history of success and failure of
the projects.
We account for two types of externalities among projects: in probability of success
and in cost of investment6. We allow probabilities of success and cost of investment to
depend on the projects already completed and on the projects in which the agent is investing
simultaneously. In our notation, we have Ψi(ht) and πi(It | ht) for i = {∅,A,B,AB}.
2.2 Principal’s and agent’s preferences
Next we introduce the principal’s and the agent’s preferences and their recursive formula-
tion. The contract’s time horizon is indeterminate: the contract is over once both projects
have been completed. Let T 6 ∞ be the expected end period of the contract. We assume
principal and agent have the same discount factor β.
The principal can only observe, period after period, whether the projects have been
successfully completed or not. He uses the history of successes and failures in the accom-
plishment of the projects to condition the sequence of transfers oﬀered to the agent. The
5The assumption that valuations of the projects are common knowledge avoids the adverse selection
problem studied in entrepreneur ﬁnancing models, like Bergeman and Hege (2002)
6We denote ΨAB as the cost of investing in the two projects simultaneously. We allow for ΨAB ≷ ΨA+ΨB.8




t=0, a sequence of transfers for each possible history
of success and failure of the projects, that maximizes his utility.
Let Zi(Wi) be the utility that completed project i provides to the principal, that is an
increasing function of the agent’s valuation of project i. We allow this function to diﬀer
among projects to reﬂect the preferences of the principal over the projects7.T h el i f e t i m e













+ πB(It | ht)
ZB(WB)
(1 − β)
+ πAB(It | ht)ZAB(WAB)
¸
]
where the ﬁrst term is the expected cost and the second them is the expected utility from
the completed projects.
The cost of a transfer scheme (that starts after history h0, where none of the projects
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+β(1 − πA(I0 | h0) − πB(I0 | h0) − πAB(I0 | h0))C∅(h1
∅)
where Ci(ht
i) represents the present discounted cost for the principal of the sequence of
transfers that starts after history ht when project i has already been completed (for i =
A,B,or neither project completed).
7In the development setting, we need to clarify that we consider a "purely altruistic" principal, in the
sense that no warm-glow giving/impure altruism (Andreoni 1990) is considered.
The Rome Declaration on Aid Harmonization (2003) points out the need to ensure that development
assistance is delivered in accordance with recipient country priorities. Flexibility on the Zi(Wi) function for
each of the projects allows us to show how strong donor preferences towards certain projects may lead to
ineﬃciencies in the contracts provided.9
Given the contract he is oﬀered, the agent makes the unobservable (discrete) decision
whether or not to invest in each of the projects. Each period, the agent consumes the part
of the transfer he does not invest, what makes consumption and investment decisions non-
separable. We assume the agent has no additional funding to invest in the project apart
from the donor’s transfers. Savings from the received funds are not allowed8. The utility
function of the agent is an increasing, concave and diﬀerentiable function of consumption,
with u(0) = 0. The agent’s reservation utility, the value of the alternative opportunities if
he does not sign the contract, is zero.











sequence of transfers he is oﬀered by the principal. Let Ψ(It | ht) be the cost for the agent
of his investment choice, and let V (ht) denote the agent’s lifetime utility after history ht.
The agent’s present value of the contract after initial history h0 (where none of the projects
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¤
as the expected present value of utility ﬂows from the completed projects when project X
is already completed, and let Vx(h1
x) denote present value for the agent of the continuation
of the contract once project X has been completed. The agent’s preferences and can be
8Allowing the agent to save from the transfers would impose an additional constraint on the feasible
contracts. Agent would compare expected returns from investment with expected returns from savings,
since both alternatives have the same marginal cost for the agent in his non-separable utility function.
Werning (2000 and 2002) and Chiappori at al.(1994) focus on the access to credit markets in repeated moral
hazard models when eﬀort decision is separable from investment decision.10
written recursively as
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Vφ(h0)=u(τ(h0) − Ψ(I0 | h0)) + βπA(I0 | h0)VA(h1
A)+βπB(I0 | h0)VB(h1
B)
+β(1 − πA(I0 | h0) − πB(I0 | h0) − πAB(I0 | h0))V∅(h1
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2.3 Optimal contract





transfers after each possible history of success and failure of the projects until both projects
are completed.
The contract oﬀered needs to be incentive compatible (agent performs the desired invest-
ment) and the recursive formulation should be consistent (the promise keeping constraint
should be satisﬁed). The investment that the contract wants to implement has to be feasi-
ble, the transfers should be at least as big as the cost of the investment the contract aims
to implement, i.e. τ(ht) > Ψ(It | ht). And the principal should also account for the agent’s
participation constraint: the agent will walk out of the contract if it does not provide him
at least the utility he had before signing the contract.




φ)), which are the transfer and promised utilities in case
project A, B or neither of the projects are completed, respectively. When both projects are
completed, the agent gets WAB, his valuation of both projects completed, and the contract
is over.
The contract may involve two types of "bonuses" for the agent. When he signs the
contract, the agent gets a Participation Bonus which is calculated by the diﬀerence
between the utility the contract provides him when he signs and his reservation value. This
participation bonus is driven by the agent’s valuation of the projects: even if the transfer11
is the minimum feasible one and the agent invests it, the agent gets an expected lifetime
utility greater than what he would obtain if he had not signed the contract, due to the
positive probability that the projects are completed in the future.
The agent may also get a subsequent Project Bonus when only one of the projects has
been successful. The project bonus is the diﬀerence between promised utility to the agent
and the minimum lifetime utility the agent can receive when only one of the projects has
been completed.
The principal’s utility has two parts: the negative eﬀect of the present discounted
value of the transfers and the positive eﬀect of the completed projects. To choose the timing
of the contract he wants to implement, the principal compares the cost and beneﬁts of the
two feasible timing alternatives: simultaneous or sequential completion of the projects. We
derive in Section 3 the cheapest contract for each timing structure, and in Section 4 we
study the expected beneﬁts of each timing structure. Once costs and beneﬁts are deﬁned,
we compare the principal’s utility for two timing structures (in Section 5) and we describe
how this comparison varies with agent’s and project’s characteristics.
3 Cost minimizing contract
We solve for the cheapest contract for each timing alternative by using the recursive for-
mulation introduced by Spear and Srivastava (1987). We diﬀer from the standard dynamic
moral hazard models9 on several points. On the one hand, the length of our contract is in-
determinate, since due to the principal’s commitment problem, our contract does not allow
for any cancellation clause before both projects are accomplished. On the other hand, the
agent’s eﬀort-investment decision is not separable from his consumption decision (he decides
how to use the received funds between investment and consumption), and it involves several
tasks, since two projects are candidates to receive investment. Moreover, the outcome of
the investment, the completed projects, is valued by both principal and agent.
The proposed contract is a dynamic multitask contract, which involves two projects that
require separate investments. In the literature, Holmstrom and Milgrom (1991) propose a
static multitask model where the agent performs multiple tasks simultaneously. Sinclair-
Desgagne (1999) obtains also in a static framework higher incentives by linking audits on
the task to outcomes. By contrast, in our dynamic setting, the principal can choose the
timing of the tasks as either simultaneous or sequential. When investment in a project is
9Among other applications in the literature, Hopenhayn and Nicolini (1997) and Pavoni (2006) adapt
the recursive dynamic moral hazard to Unemployment Compensation Schemes.12
successful, it produces an observable outcome, which is the completed project. Moreover,
the implementation of the tasks has a direct eﬀect on the principal’s and agent’s utilities
since completed projects are valued by both.
Our contribution to the contract theory literature comes from the introduction of a
multitask structure in an indeterminate length contract where the principal can choose
initially the timing to implement the tasks depending on their characteristics. Our contract
does not allow for any termination clause before the completion of the projects. The agent’s
valuation of the projects, together with the special dynamics of each timing structure, allow
for high-powered incentives in each task.
After any feasible history of success and failure of the two projects, the contract can
be summarized (recursively) by the following elements: transfer, and promised utilities for
each possible realization of completion or incompletion of the projects. The principal needs
to give incentives to the agent to give up some consumption today and invest that money
to have tomorrow, with some probability, a completed project. The principal has two tools
to provide incentives to the agent: the transfer, which determines consumption the agent
can have today even if he invests, and the promises, the well-being promised to the agent
when outcome of the investment is observed. We study, in a world where the principal can
commit to a sequence of transfers for each possible history of success and failure of the
projects, how the principal uses these instruments in each timing structure, and how his
use of each of them depends on the projects’ and agents’ characteristics.
To obtain the cheapest contract for each timing alternative, we proceed backwards. We
start with the cost of the contract when only one of the projects has been completed (section
3.1), and we use this information to compute the cost of the simultaneous (section 3.2) and
sequential (section 3.3) contract costs. Once we have the costs of each timing structure, we
compare them (section 3.4) to obtain the cheapest contract for each project’s and agent’s
characteristics.
3.1 One project optimal contract
We start with the cost minimization problem when only one of the projects has been com-
pleted. The objective of the principal is to provide incentives to the agent to complete the
remaining project at the cheapest cost, since the contract continues until the remaining
project is completed.
Deﬁne C∗
x(V ) as the expected discounted cost for the principal associated with the
cheapest feasible incentive compatible contract that provides the agent a lifetime utility of13
V when project X has already been completed (and project Y still needs to be completed).
The elements of the recursive contract in this situation are (τ,V0): the transfer and promised
utility in case investment on the remaining project is not successful. The principal’s cost
minimization problem has the form:
C∗
x(V )=m i n
τ,V0
£
τ + β(1 − πy)C∗
x(V 0)
¤
s.t. V = u(τ − Ψy)+wx + β
£
πyWXY +( 1− πy)V 0¤
(1a)
u(τ)+βV 0 + wx 6 u(τ − Ψy)+β
£
πyWXY +( 1− πy)V 0¤
+ wx (1b)
V 0 > Wx (1c)
τ > Ψy (1d)
where Wx denotes the agent’s lifetime utility from completed project X,a n dwx denotes the
instantaneous ﬂow project X completed provides to the agent. WXY denotes the agent’s
lifetime utility when both projects are completed. Equation (1a) is the promise keeping
constraint, (1b) the incentive compatibility constraint, (1c) the Participation constraint
and (1d) the feasibility constraint (the agent should be transferred at least the cost of
investment).
The function C∗
x is the ﬁxed point of the T operator deﬁned by
TCx(V )=m i n
τ,V0
£
τ + β(1 − πy)Cx(V 0)
¤
s.t. (1a),(1b),(1c) and (1d)
T is an operator on the space of continuous, increasing and convex functions. T is a
contraction on a complete metric space since Blackwell (1965) suﬃcient conditions for a
contraction are satisﬁed. It has a unique ﬁxed point C∗. The cost function C∗ is increasing,
convex and diﬀerentiable. The proof is provided in the Appendix B .
Let us start with the cheapest stationary contract. This contract provides the same
transfer for all attempts until investment in the remaining project is successful. Derivation
is shown at the Appendix A.1. At the cheapest stationary contract, the promise keeping
constraint binds. Suppose it does not bind. Then we can propose an alternative contract
with smaller transfer that still satisﬁes the incentive compatibility constraint (1b),t h a tg i v e s
the agent at least the required lifetime utility so that (1a) is satisﬁed, and that is cheaper,
what leads to a contradiction.14
Let ˜ τ be the smaller transfer that satisﬁes the promise keeping and incentive compat-
ibility constraints at the stationary contract when project X has already been completed.
We deﬁne V X as the utility that the cheapest stationary contract provides to the agent,
V X =
u(˜ τ − Ψy)+wx + βπyWXY
1 − β(1 − πy)
>W x (2)
We solve now for the principal’s (non-stationary) cost minimization problem, when
diﬀerent transfers are allowed for diﬀerent attempts until the remaining project is completed.
Let μ, λ and γ be the Lagrange multipliers for promise keeping (1a), incentive compatibility
(1b) and feasibility constraints (1c) and (1d) respectively. The First Order Conditions are:
1 − μu0(τ − Ψy)+λ
¡







dV 0 − μ
¸
+ λπy − γ =0 (3)






x is an increasing function, μ>0.
Intuitively, the sequence of promised utilities (and correspondent transfers) for the suc-
cessive attempts until the remaining project is completed should be a non-increasing func-
tion. Suppose not: then it would be optimal for the agent not to invest and collect the
increasing promised utilities (and correspondent transfers) that the contract provides him,
but that would contradict incentive compatibility of the contract.
Given the non-increasing sequence of promised utilities, the participation constraint
V 0 > Wx can not bind since, in case of failure, the decreasing set of promised utilities
would converge to V = Wx that cannot be provided in an incentive compatible and promise
keeping contract. We need to check the feasible levels of utility that can be provided in an
incentive compatible and promise keeping contract.
Lemma 1 (Feasible utilities) The set of lifetime utilities the principal provides at the
cheapest incentive compatible and promise keeping contract is the interval [V X,W AB),w h e r e
V
¯
x is the lifetime utility provided to the agent at the cheapest stationary contract.
Proof. Suppose V> W AB. The utility the contract provides to the agent is greater
than the agent’s valuation of the completed projects; the incentive compatibility constraint
cannot be satisﬁed in this situation.15
Suppose V< V X. If V 0 <V at the optimal contract, we would reach V 0 = Wx = V ,
since sequence of promised utilities proposed is decreasing for the successive attempts. But
this level cannot be provided by an incentive compatible and promise keeping contract. If
V 0 = V> W x we would have a stationary contract at V< V X, but this would not be the
cost minimizing alternative since V X is the cheapest level of utility that can be provided in
a promise keeping and incentive compatible stationary contract.
Once the set of utilities the principal is willing to provide is determined, we can rewrite
the participation constraint (1c) as
V 0 > V X >W x
and let γ be the multiplier for this constraint. In the Appendix A.1 we show that the cost
function is non-increasing in the agent’s valuation of the completed projects, increasing in
the investment cost and decreasing in the probability of success.
Proposition 1 (Optimal contract) The optimal sequence of transfers (and promised util-
ities) is decreasing for the successive failed attempts, and converges to ˜ τ (and V X), the cost
minimizing stationary contract.
Proof. From (3) and (4)we get that V 0 6 V, the sequence of promised utilities (and
transfers) is non-increasing for the successive attempts until remaining project is completed.
Suppose the sequence of promised utilities converges to ¯ V>V X (since ¯ V<V X would
not be chosen as shown in Lemma 1). We can propose an alternative contract that provides
ˆ V such that ¯ V>ˆ V> V X that is cheaper than the contract that converges to ¯ V ,s ow e
reach a contradiction.
Let (τ,V0) be the optimal contract that provides utility V to the agent. In case of failure,
the utility to be provided to the agent is V 0 6 V. Let (ˆ τ, ˆ V 0) be the contract provided in
case of failure. We know that ˆ V 0 6 V 0 6 V , and we want to show that τ > ˆ τ. Suppose not.
Given convexity of the cost function, we know that the marginal cost of promise in case
of failure is increasing with the utility to be provided. For smaller utilities to be provided,
promise in case of failure is relatively cheaper, so the optimal contract provides a decreasing
sequence of transfers for the successive attempts that converges to the cheapest stationary
contract transfer ˜ τ.
3.2 Sequential contract
We present the principal’s cost minimization problem when he wants to give the agent incen-
tives to invest in both projects sequentially: ﬁrst project X is completed and subsequently16
project Y is completed. We start with symmetric projects, and without loss of generality
we present the principal’s problem when project B is completed ﬁrst. In Section 3.2.1 we
study the optimal order of the sequence of projects with respect to the agent’s valuation of
the projects and the externalities among them.
Deﬁne C∗
B_A(V ) as the expected discounted cost for the principal of the cheapest se-
quential contract that starts with project B and delivers the agent a level of lifetime utility
V . A contract in this situation is characterized by the triplet (τ,V
0
B,V0): transfer, promised
utility when project B is completed, and promised utility when investment is not successful.
The principal’s cost minimization problem has the form:
C∗

















B +( 1− πB)V 0
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(5a)









B > V B (5c)
V 0 > 0 (5d)
τ > ΨB (5e)
where the function C∗
B_A is the ﬁxed point of the T operator on the complete metric space
of increasing, convex and diﬀerentiable functions deﬁned by










B)+( 1− πB)CB_A(V 0)
ii
s.t. (5a),(5b),(5d),(5c) and (5e)
We prove in the Appendix A.1 that C∗
B_A is an increasing, convex and diﬀerentiable func-
tion.
The principal minimizes the cost of the contract subject to the promise keeping (5a),
the incentive compatibility (5b) and the participation constraints, that in this case involve
promise when B is completed (5c)10 and when neither project is completed (5d).M o r e o v e r ,
there is a feasibility constraint (5e) since the transfer has to be at least as big as required
10When project B has been completed, participation constraint of the agent is given by V
0
B > WB. But from
the optimal contract when project B has been completed we know that V
0
B > V B is needed for consistency
with the principal’s optimal choice once B is completed.17
investment. The cost function C∗
B and the level of utility V B represent the cost function
and the minimum utility to be provided when project B is already completed, as previously
derived. Whether (5c) constraint binds or not determines if the project receives a project
bonus, if utility provided when completed is greater than the minimum the principal should
provide.
We need to take into account an additional "incentive compatibility" constraint for
consistency of the sequential formulation: it has to be in the agent’s best interest to invest
ﬁrst in the project the contract prescribes rather than to deviate and invest in the alternative
project. When projects are technically symmetric, i.e. they have the same cost of investment
and probabilities of success, for the sequential contract that starts with project B, this
constraint is given by
V 0
B > V A (6)
since otherwise the agent would prefer to invest in A rather than B, given symmetry in costs
of investment and probabilities of success. This constraint results from the assumption that
the contract does not end until both projects are completed, and because of that we need
to assume that, in case of deviation, the contract continues with the remaining project at
the cheapest feasible contract, that is the stationary one.
Let μ,λ,γ1,γ2,ηbe the Lagrange multipliers for the (5a),(5b),(5d),(5c) and (5e) con-
straints respectively. The First Order Conditions of the principal’s problem are:
1 − μu0(τ − ΨB)+λ
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dV 0 − μ
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+ λβπB + γ1 =0















= −λβπB − γ1
V 0 6 V (7)18
The sequence of promised utilities is non-increasing for successive attempts until the ﬁrst
project in the sequence is completed.
Let us present the stationary sequential contract, the contract that provides same
transfer (and same promised utility) for all attempts until the ﬁrst project in the sequence
is completed. The principal’s objective is to choose the transfer and promised utility in
case of success of the ﬁr s tp r o j e c ti nt h es e q u e n c et h a tm i n imizes his cost. The principal’s
stationary cost minimization problem is given by










[1 − β(1 − πB)]
s.t. u(τ)(1 − β(1 − πB)) − u(τ − ΨB)(1 − β) 6 βπB(1 − β)V 0
B (8a)
V 0
B > V B (8b)
τ > ΨB (8c)
where (8a) gives the set of pairs (τ,V
0
B) that satisfy the incentive compatibility and (bind-
ing) promise keeping constraints, (8b) gives the constraint on promise when project B is
completed, and (8c) is the investment feasibility constraint.
Let λ b et h eL a g r a n g em u l t i p l i e rf o r(21a), γB be the Lagrange multiplier for (8b) and
γΨ be the Lagrange multiplier for (8c). The First Order Condition of the stationary problem
with respect to τ is
1+λ
£
[1 − β(1 − πB)]u0(τ) − (1 − β)u0(τ − ΨB)
¤
− γΨ =0 (9)
Suppose (8a) does not bind, λ =0 .F o r(9) to be satisﬁed, we need γΨ > 0, which implies
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βπB(1 − β)V 0
B
(1 − β(1 − πB))
u(ΨB)
(1 − β)




and either V 0
B = V B or the incentive compatibility constraint binds at the optimal contract.
Suppose not, then we can propose an alternative contract (ΨB,V0
B − ε) with ε<V0
B − V B
that is cheaper than the original contract with project bonus, which is a contradiction.19
Let (τ∗,V
0∗





1 − β(1 − πB)
(10)
In the cost minimization problem, the feasibility constraint can not bind, since there is no
incentive compatible and promise keeping contract that can provide V =0 . We need to
deﬁne the set of feasible promised utilities that the principal may oﬀer in the sequential
cost minimization problem.
Lemma 2 (Feasible utilities) The set of feasible utilities that may be provided in an in-
centive compatible and promise keeping sequential contract is in the interval of V [V seq,W AB),
where V seq denotes the utility provided at the cheapest sequential stationary contract.
Proof. If V> W AB the agent gets more utility than what he would have gotten if both
projects were completed, what contradicts the incentive compatibility constraint.
If V< V seq, by (7) we would have V 0 6 V< V seq , and the sequence of provided
utilities would converge to the stationary contract ¯ V,0 6 ¯ V< V seq.I f¯ V =0 , there is
no feasible incentive compatible and promise keeping contract that can provide this utility.
And if ¯ V> 0, since V seq is the cheapest incentive compatible and promise keeping utility
that can be provided in a stationary contract, we reach a contradiction.
Once we have the set of feasible utilities, we can derive the optimal contract that allows
for diﬀerent transfers for successive attempts until a project is completed. The
principal chooses a level of utility to provide to the agent that minimizes the cost of the
contract subject to (5a),(5b),(5c), (5e) and the new feasibility constraint given by the set
of feasible utilities.
Proposition 2 (Cheapest sequential contract) The cheapest sequential contract is a
stationary contract at V = V seq until the ﬁrst project is completed. If the second project in
the sequence gets a project bonus, the agent then receives a decreasing sequence of transfers
that converges to the stationary contract when this project is completed.
Proof. The sequential cost function is increasing. Suppose we look for the optimal
contract that provides an initial level of lifetime utility to the agent V> V seq. Condition
(7) tells us that it is optimal to provide V 0 6 V , and so the optimal contract converges to a
stationary contract at V = V seq. But the principal can propose from the beginning of the
relationship a stationary contract at V = V seq > 0 that is feasible and cheaper.
When a project receives a project bonus, the sequence of transfers is decreasing and
converges to the cheapest stationary contract when the ﬁrst project has been completed.
Proof is provided in Proposition 1.20
The optimally of the stationary contract is intuitive. The cheapest stationary contract
is the cheapest contract that gives incentives to the agent to invest. Investment is a discrete
choice and probability of success does not vary with amount invested (as long as it is
at least the required level). Then, it is optimal for the principal to keep providing the
cheapest stationary contract that gives the agent incentives to undertake the required given
investment for all attempts up to the ﬁrst project in the sequence is completed.
At the cheapest sequential contract, the agent gets a Participation Bonus when he
signs the contract: he is provided a utility V seq that is greater than his reservation utility.
Even if the agent’s transfer equals investment cost, the expected value of the completed
projects provides him positive expected utility. This result, as opposed to the standard
m o r a lh a z a r dm o d e l sw h e r ea g e n t ’ su t i l i t yi sd r i v e nd o w nt ot h er e s e r v a t i o nl e v e l ,i sg i v e n
by the fact that completed projects are valued by the agent.
3.2.1 Optimal sequence of projects
Once we have the optimal contract for symmetric projects, we look at the optimal sequential
order of projects for non-symmetric projects.
We need to ensure that the agent prefers to invest in the project the principal wants
him to complete ﬁrst instead of investing in the alternative project. As done in (6) for
technically symmetric projects, when the sequential contract starts with project X,t h e
contract should be such that
V 0
X > V Y
since otherwise the agent would rather invest in Y than in X, given symmetry in costs of
investment and probabilities of success. Since the eﬀect of technical externalities among the
projects appears once one of the projects has been completed, this constraint still holds for
the ﬁrst project in the sequence, since the externality eﬀect would be reﬂected on V Y .
We start by comparing projects that only diﬀer in their valuation by the agent, and we
ﬁnd that it is optimal to start with the more valued project. We continue with projects for
which there exist externalities: once one is completed, the remaining project is more likely
to succeed or requires smaller investment than before. We ﬁnd that when the less valued
project is the one that generates the externalities, it is cheaper to start with this project
when the externalities are large enough.
Lemma 3 (Cheapest timing for diﬀerent valuations) When projects only diﬀer in their
valuation by the agent, the cheapest sequential contract starts with the more valued project.21
Proof. Since projects only diﬀer in their valuation by the agent, let π = πA = πB.
Without loss of generality suppose WA <W B. Consider the sequential contract starting
with project A, (τ,V
0
A). For this contract to be incentive compatible we need (6) to be
satisﬁed. From the cost of this contract and the properties of the cost function when only














[1 − β(1 − π)]
that shows that the cost of the stationary contract that starts with B is smaller than the
cost of the original timing, what contradicts optimally of the sequence that starts with the
less valued project.
Lemma 4 (Cheapest timing with externalities) When one of the projects positively
aﬀects the probability of success of the other project, i.e. πx = πy = π when neither of
the projects is completed but πx >πonce project Y has been completed, it is optimal to
start with the less valued project that produces the positive externality when the externality
is large enough.
Proof. Without loss of generality assume WA <W B and assume that it is project A
that produces the externality. Consider the sequential contract that starts with project B,
the more valued project. For this contract to be incentive compatible we need
V 0
B > V A










[1 − β(1 − π)]
which follows from V 0
B > V A and C∗
B being an increasing function. The cost function is
decreasing in the valuation of the completed project and also decreasing in the probability









We could propose an alternative contract with the reverse order of projects that would be
cheaper, what contradicts optimally of the original ordering.22
3.2.2 Comparative statics: agents and projects characteristics
Our objective is to see how the cost minimizing contract adapts to diﬀerent agent and
project characteristics.
The agent is forced to undertake a risk with the investment. The Project bonus is the
extra utility the contract provides to the agent once a project is completed. It is, together
with the transfers, an instrument the principal has to give the agent incentives to invest and
to compensate him for the risk he is undertaking. We want to know how the agent’s risk
aversion and time preferences aﬀect the Project Bonuses provided in the cost minimizing
contract. We obtain that agents with more concave utility functions and the ones that
discount the future the most are the candidates to obtain project bonuses.
Proposition 3 (Risk aversion and project bonus) At the cheapest stationary contract,
a project bonus upon completion of the ﬁrst project may be provided to agents with Arrow-





Proof is provided at Appendix C. The intuition is as follows: agents with more concave
utility functions are more likely to obtain project bonuses, since they need greater compen-
sation for the risk of the investment they are induced to take. From (11) we ﬁnd that for
greater costs of investment more agents are likely to receive positive bonus. For projects
with greater probability of success, the result is the opposite. These comparative statics
are intuitive: greater cost of investment implies higher cost to take a risk, and agents need
to be compensated for this fact. Greater probability of success for same investment makes
the project less risky so there are fewer agents that need to be compensated.
W i t hr e s p e c tt ot i m ep r e f e r e n c e s ,w eﬁnd that greater discounting increases the set of
candidate agents to receive project bonuses. The more the agents discount the future, the
less they value today the project that may be completed next period, and the principal
needs to provide extra compensation to induce the agents to invest.
Claim 1 (Sequential transfers change with projects externalities) When one of the
projects positively aﬀects the probability of success of the other project, (i.e. πx = πy = π
when neither of the projects is completed but πx|y >πonce project y has been completed),
transfers are non-increasing and promises of success are non-decreasing with the size of the
externality.
Proof. We want to show that transfers are non-increasing in the technical externalities.
Suppose not. Let (τ,V0
B) be the cheapest contract in the absence of externalities. This23
contract is feasible when ﬁrst project in the sequence generates a technical externality on
the second project of the sequence (incentive compatibility and promise keeping constraints
do not change). But since the promised utility in case of success becomes cheaper in the
presence of externalities, we can propose an alternative incentive compatible and promise
keeping contract with smaller transfer and greater promised utility that provides the agent
same lifetime utility and is cheaper, what contradicts increasing transfers with externalities.
Claim 2 (Sequential transfers with respect to investment costs) When the cost of
investment decreases, the transfer and promised utility in case of success decrease.
Proof. Suppose transfers and promised utilities were greater for smaller investment
costs. Let (τ,V0
B) be the cheapest (and by Proposition 2 stationary) contract for investment
cost Ψ that provides the agent a utility V seq.F o rˆ Ψ < Ψ, (τ,V0
B) is a feasible stationary
contract that provides V> V seq and satisﬁes incentive compatibility and promise keeping
constraints, since
u(τ) − u(τ − ˆ Ψ)+
h
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(Ψ − ˆ Ψ)
what implies h







We can propose an alternative contract (˜ τ,V0
B) with ˜ τ = τ − ετ,
ετ = −
u0(τ − ˆ Ψ)
h




that is cheaper than a contract that provides greater transfers for smaller probabilities of
success, what leads to a contradiction.
Claim 3 (Sequential transfers with respect to value interactions) As the value in-
teraction among projects increases, the optimal contract provides non-increasing transfers.
Proof is provided at Appendix C. Intuitively, as value interaction increases, increases the
value of the completion of the projects for the agent, so less incentives through transfers need
to be provided. Moreover, promise when one of the projects has already been completed
becomes relatively cheaper, making promises relatively cheaper with respect to transfers as
an instrument to provide incentives to the agent.24
3.3 Simultaneous contract
The alternative to sequential investment in the projects is to induce the agents to invest in
both projects simultaneously. We present here the cost minimization problem for the simul-
taneous timing alternative. We start with technically symmetric projects equally valued by
the agent (to simplify notation we denote π = πA = πB), and we relax this assumption to
see how the contract adapts to diﬀerent technical characteristics of the projects and agent’s
preferences.
Let C∗
ab(V ) be the expected discounted cost for the principal of the cheapest contract
where investment is induced on projects A and B simultaneously that provides lifetime
utility V to the agent. The cheapest contract that induces the agent to invest in both
projects simultaneously is the solution to the following minimization problem:
C∗




















s.t.V = u(τ − ΨAB)+β
h
π2WAB +( 1− π)2V 0 + π(1 − π)V
0

















B +( 1− π)V 0
i
6 V (12d)
V 0 > 0 (12e)
V
0
A > V A (12f)
V
0
B > V B (12g)
τ > ΨAB (12h)
where λ0,λ A and λB are the Lagrange multipliers for the incentive compatibility constraints
(12b), (12c) and (12d),a n dμ is the multiplier for the promise keeping constraint (12a).
Constraints (12g) and (12f) are the participation constraints when one of the projects has
been completed. C∗
j and V j represent the cost function and the minimum utility to be
provided when project j is already completed, for j = A,B. The function C∗
ab(V ) is the
ﬁxed point of the T operator on the metric space of increasing, convex and diﬀerentiable
functions deﬁned by25

















+( 1− π)2Cab(V 0)
ii
subject to (12a),(12b),(12c),(12d),(12e),(12g),(12f) and (12h)
C∗
ab is an increasing, diﬀerentiable and convex function. The proof is provided in the
Appendix B.
To derive the optimal simultaneous contract we follow a reasoning parallel to the sequen-
tial contract. Let V sim be the utility provided at the cheapest stationary simultaneous
contract.
When we allow transfers to vary for the successive attempts until one (or both)
projects are completed, the First Order Conditions of the principal’s problem are
1 − μu0(τ − ΨAB)=η − λA(u0(τ − ΨA) − u0(τ − ΨAB)) − λB(u0(τ − ΨB)−
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that with (14) gives
V 0 6 V (16)
The cheapest simultaneous contract provides a non-increasing sequence of promised utilities
for successive attempts until one or both projects are completed.
We ﬁnd that the agent’s participation constraint can not bind, V =0cannot be pro-
vided by an incentive compatible and promise keeping contract. We deﬁne in the following
Lemma the boundaries of the set of utilities that the principal may provide in an incentive
compatible and promise keeping simultaneous contract.26
Lemma 5 (Feasible utilities) The set of feasible utilities that may be provided in the





where V sim is the lifetime utility provided at the cheapest simultaneous contract.
Proof. For V> W AB the agent is provided more utility than what he would get if both
projects were completed, what contradicts incentive compatibility constraint.
For V< V sim, we have V 0 6 V< V sim by (16), and sequence of provided utilities
converges to ¯ V, Vsim >V = ¯ V > 0.I f ¯ V =0 , there is no incentive compatible and
promise keeping contract that can provide this utility. If ¯ V> 0, there exists an alternative
stationary contract, V sim, that is cheaper. We reach a contradiction.
Proposition 4 (Cheapest simultaneous contract) The cheapest simultaneous contract
is a stationary contract that provides V sim up to one of the projects is completed. The agent
receives a constant transfer for all attempts until one (or both) projects are completed.
When only one of the projects is completed, if that project gets a project bonus, the agent
receives a decreasing sequence of transfers that converges to a stationary contract.
Proof. The cost function is an increasing function. The minimum level of utility that
may be provided in an incentive compatible and promise keeping contract coincides with
the cheapest one, and it is given by V sim, the cheapest simultaneous stationary contract.
In the stationary contract, the same transfers are provided for all attempts until one (or
both) projects are completed.
When a project receives a project bonus, the sequence of transfers is decreasing and
converges to the stationary contract when this given project has been completed. Proof is
provided in Proposition 1.
From the project characteristics we know that the probability of success depends only
on a discrete investment choice. Intuitively, the cheapest contract is the one that gives the
agent the cheapest combination of incentives that induces him to invest in both projects.
And this minimum coincides with the cheapest stationary contract.
The agent gets a Participation Bonus when he signs the contract, that is given by
V sim. Like in the simultaneous case, since the agent values the completed projects, even if
he gets the minimum transfer feasible to invest, he gets a positive utility from the expected
value of the projects in which he is simultaneously investing.
3.3.1 Comparative statics: Agents and Projects characteristics
We proceed now to study how project characteristics and agents’ preferences aﬀect Project
Bonuses in the cheapest simultaneous contract, i.e. when do we have promised utilities27
over the minimum feasible level when only one of the projects is successful. As agent’s
characteristics, the agent’s risk aversion and time preferences play a key role. As project
characteristics, we look at the agent’s valuation of the projects, investment costs and prob-
abilities of success for both projects.
Proposition 5 (Project bonus and agent’s preferences) At the cheapest simultane-
ous contract for technically symmetric projects, a project bonus is provided to agents with
Arrow-Pratt absolute risk aversion
r(τ) >
βπ(1 − π)
[1 − β(1 − π)](ΨAB − Ψ)
(17)
Proof is provided in Appendix D. The more risk averse agents are the more likely to
receive a project bonus, since they are the agents that need greater compensation for the
risk they undertake with investment. The set of candidate agents to receive project bonuses
decreases as the time discount increases. When agents discount less the future, smaller
bonuses need to be provided to make them undertake the risk of investing with delayed
returns.
We now look at how the optimal contract changes when the projects involved are not
technically symmetric and the agent values them diﬀerently. We start with the case where
projects only diﬀer in their value for the agent, and we ﬁnd that project bonuses go to the
less valued project. We continue with how diﬀerent projects’ technical characteristics may
give project bonuses to the more valued project when it has greater investment cost or a
smaller probability of success.
Proposition 6 (Project bonus for diﬀerent project valuations) In the simultaneous
cheapest contract with technically symmetric projects, either no project bonus is promised,
or if there is a project bonus it is greater for the less valued project.
Proof is provided in Appendix D. The aim of project bonuses is to compensate the
agent for the eﬀort he makes in the investment. For technically symmetric projects, the less
valued project may require a greater extra compensation to induce the agent to invest in it.
Proposition 7 (Asymmetric investment costs) At the cheapest simultaneous contract,
when the two projects have diﬀerent investment costs, we can have project bonuses for the
more valued project when this project is the one with greater investment cost.
Proof is provided in Appendix D. The intuition is as follows: project bonuses are given
to compensate the agent for the investment he undertakes. The agent compares costs and
beneﬁts of the investment in each of the projects. When a project has a greater investment
cost, even if it is the more valued project, he may need an extra bonus to compensate for
the extra eﬀo r ti tr e q u i r e s .28
Proposition 8 (Asymmetric probabilities of success) At the cheapest simultaneous
contract, when the projects have diﬀerent probabilities of success, we can have that the
more valued project gets project bonus if this project is the one with smaller probability of
success.
Proof is provided in Appendix D. Despite of valuation diﬀerences, projects that are less
likely to succeed are less appealing for the agent, and the principal may need to compensate
for this fact.
3.4 Cost comparison of the sequential and simultaneous contracts
We compare the cost for the principal of the two alternative timing structures: simultaneous
versus sequential completion of the projects. We do this comparison under two possible
information scenarios: observable and non-observable agent’s investment.
Together with cost, an important variable to consider is length of the contract. Ex-
pected length of the simultaneous contract is smaller than expected length of the sequen-
tial contract. Expected length for each timing alternative is given by
Expected Length(simultaneous)=





and the diﬀerence is
EL(sim) − EL(seq) = −π3 + π2 +6 π +1> 0 for all π [0,1]
3.4.1 First best: Observable investment
Let us start comparing the cost of the two timing alternatives when investment is observable
and so transfers equal investment cost are the cheapest feasible alternative. In our model,
even with incomplete information, transfers equal to investment cost may be chosen since
for some sets of parameters they may be incentive compatible. Let CFI
seq and CFI
sim be the
expected costs of the full information contract for the sequential and simultaneous timing
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[1 − β(1 − πB)(1 − πA)]
(ΨAB +
βπA(1 − πB)ΨB
1 − β(1 − πB|A)
+
βπB(1 − πA)ΨA
1 − β(1 − πA|B)
)29
We ﬁnd that when projects are totally symmetric and independent, the cheapest alternative
is the sequential timing. When πi|j >π i for any project i (probability of success of project
i increases when project j is already completed), sequential contract that starts with the
p r o j e c tt h a tg e n e r a t e st h ee x t e r n a l i t yi st h ec h e a p e s tt i m i n g . W h e nΨAB < 2Ψ, we have
that whenever
2Ψ − ΨAB > Ψ
£
(1 − β)(1 + β(1 − π)2)+( 1− π)2βπ
¤
[1 − β(1 − π)]
where
£
(1 − β)(1 + β(1 − π)2)+( 1− π)2βπ
¤
[1 − β(1 − π)]
< 1
simultaneous contract is cheaper than the sequential one. Whenever cost to invest in both
projects simultaneously is signiﬁcantly smaller than the sum of costs to invest on both
projects by themselves, a simultaneous contract is the cheapest contract under complete
information.
3.4.2 Second best: Unobservable investment
When investment is not observable, it is necessary to provide the agent the appropriate
incentives to invest. We ﬁnd that the simultaneous contract is cheaper than the sequential
one whenever the sequential contract provides a transfer big enough to cover investment in
both projects. When the incentives (in form of transfer over the investment cost) are such
that with sequential transfers simultaneous investment is feasible, the principal can always
design an alternative simultaneous contract including Project Bonuses that is cheaper. As
we showed in the sequential contract comparative statics, sequential contract transfers are
likely to fall in this category when technical externalities among projects are not important
(Claim 1), when valuation of the last project in the sequence has little eﬀect on the joint
valuation of the projects (Claim 3), and when ΨAB is signiﬁcantly smaller than the sum of
investment costs in each of the projects independently (Claim 2). For totally independent
projects, we are likely to fall in this category when costs of investment are relatively high
with respect to the agent’s valuation of the projects.
The intuition is as follows: when investment is not observable, the principal needs to
provide the agent incentives to undertake the risk associated to investment. If the transfer
that needs to be provided is large enough, the principal can provide an alternative simul-
taneous contract where the agent "diversiﬁes" the risk of the investment he is undertaking
that is cheaper.30
Proposition 9 For technically symmetric projects (i.e.πA = πB,ΨA = ΨB),w h e nt r a n s -
fers of the cheapest sequential contract are such that simultaneous investment is feasible,
i.e. τseq > ΨAB, simultaneous contract is cheaper.
Proof is provided in Appendix E. The intuition is as follows: when cost of investment
is big enough, for any sequential contract we can construct an alternative simultaneous
contract with the same sequence of transfers that is cheaper (given that expected length of
the contract decreases), what contradicts the sequential being the cheapest feasible contract.
We show in Appendix A that the fact that when investment is not observable simulta-
neous contract is the cheapest alternative under some circumstances does not depend on
the commitment to a sequence of transfers assumption. At the stationary contract that
does not allow for project bonuses, we also ﬁnd that moral hazard makes simultaneous
investment the cheapest alternative under some circumstances.
4 Principal’s Expected Beneﬁts
The principal compares expected cost and expected beneﬁts of each timing alternative to
choose the strategy that maximizes his utility. We derive and compare here the principal’s
expected beneﬁts for the two alternative timing structures to complete both projects.
It is realistic to imagine that principals may prefer some projects over the rest. In a
Foreign Aid setting, political, religious, and moral factors of the donor society may aﬀect
the donor’s valuation of the diﬀerent projects. In that case, the result of the expected
beneﬁt comparison of the two timing alternatives may not coincide with the timing that
maximizes the recipient’s expected well-being from the completed projects. This bias in
donor’s preferences may generate ineﬃciencies in the contract: there may exist a cheaper
alternative that increases the agent’s expected wellbeing that is not chosen due to the
principal’s biased preferences.
In a corporate ﬁnance setting, some projects may maximize the value of the ﬁrm but may
not be the ones preferred by the managers. In that case, the possibility of the shareholders
to impose their preferred timing acts as a protection mechanism against the manager’s
prioritizing their preferences over the value of the ﬁrm.
The function Z(W) measures how projects (and agent’s valuation of the projects) enter
the principal’s utility function. We allow this function to vary among projects to reﬂect the
principal’s preferences over the projects. We assume that the principal’s valuation of the
projects completed by the agent has the form
Zi(Wi)=αiWi for i = A,B31
and
ZABpi(WAB)=αjWj +m a x ( αA,α B)[WAB − WA − WB]
denotes principal’s extra-utility when project j is completed whenever i had already been
accomplished.
The expected beneﬁt for the principal of the sequential contract that starts with project















βt+1(1 − π)tπZABpA(WAB)] =
=
βπ













1 − β(1 − π)
¸
and we see that to start with the more valued project maximizes the expected beneﬁts
of the sequential contract. This ordering coincides with the cost minimizing sequence for
technically symmetric projects.
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µ
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1 − β(1 − π)
¶32
To account for externalities in probabilities of success, let us simplify notation and deﬁne
πi/j as the probability of success of project i when project j is already completed. The
expected beneﬁts of each timing structure become:
E(Z(W))Seq =
βπA












1 − β(1 − πB|A)
+
βπBπA|BZAB|B(WAB)
1 − β(1 − πA|B)
+ πAπBZ(WAB)]
The simultaneous contract provides greater expected beneﬁt to the agent when WAB is sig-
niﬁcantly greater than WA+WB, i.e., when the projects have important value interactions.
When the utility the projects provide increases signiﬁcantly with their joint completion, a
contract where both projects receive simultaneous investment maximizes expected beneﬁts.
When there are important externalities in the probabilities of success of the projects, se-
quential contract is more likely to provide greater expected beneﬁts than the simultaneous
timing. When preferences of the principal are biased towards a project (i.e. αA 6= αB) with
respect to the agent’s, the sequential contract that starts with the principal’s preferred
project is the timing alternative that maximizes principal’s expected beneﬁts.
5 Optimal contract
Once we determine the costs and beneﬁts of each timing alternative, we can compare the
two to choose the principal’s utility maximizing contract.
From the cost of the contract,w eﬁnd that the simultaneous contract is cheaper than
the sequential one when the latter provides a transfer greater than the simultaneous invest-
ment cost. From the cheapest sequential contract, we ﬁnd that transfers are more likely to
be greater than the simultaneous investment cost when there are no technical externalities
among the projects, and when there is small interaction among project valuations. When
investment costs are such that simultaneous cost is signiﬁcantly smaller than the sum of
independent investment costs in each of the projects, it is likely that the sequential transfer
is greater than the simultaneous investment cost.
From the expected beneﬁts for the principal, we see that a simultaneous contract
provides greater expected beneﬁts when there are important value interactions among the33
projects. When there are technical externalities among the projects, sequential timing is
more likely to be the expected beneﬁts maximizing alternative.
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Figure 2: Optimal Contract
The table shows the optimal timing for diﬀerent combinations of technical externalities
and valuation interactions among the projects. We ﬁnd that, for large technical externalities,
the optimal contract is a sequential one that starts with the project that produces the
technical externality. When value interaction among the projects is critical, a simultaneous
contract is the optimal strategy so long as the interactions are suﬃciently high.
For independent projects, i.e. projects with negligible value interactions and technical
externalities, the optimal contract depends on the relation between investment costs and
probabilities of success, as well as the agent’s valuation of the projects. When projects
are relatively devalued by the agent, or require high or very risky investments, the optimal
timing is simultaneous.
When both technical externalities and value interactions are important, optimal timing
depends on the relative value of each force. When value interaction is important enough,
simultaneous is the optimal timing. And when technical externalities are more important,
the optimal timing is sequential.
6C o n c l u s i o n s
We present the optimal contract for use when a principal provides funds to an agent to
build two projects. In a multitask dynamic model wherein the principal cannot commit to
cut the ﬂow of funds to the agent prior to both projects’ completion, and whereby both
principal and agent value the projects, we derive optimal incentive payments. The agent
makes a (discrete) decision as to whether to invest in one, both or neither of the projects.
The contract has an indeterminate length; it does not end until both projects are completed.34
It is our purpose to use this model as a “cookbook” of sorts: we show how the optimal
contract adapts to diﬀerent agent and project characteristics. We derive the optimal tim-
ing and sequence of transfers for diﬀerent projects that accounts for donor and recipient
preferences
All agents receive a participation bonus when they sign the contract. This bonus exists
because the agent values the completed projects. The agent’s project valuations are also
involved in inducing the agent to invest in multiple tasks in a dynamic setting: the agent
values the projects by himself, and the contract can compensate for diﬀerences in valuations
and technical characteristics of the projects to provide high-powered incentives to the agent
to invest in both projects. We ﬁnd that, for some projects and recipients, the valuation of
the projects by the agent allows for an incentive compatible contract where transfers equal
investment costs.
Candidate agents to receive project bonuses are those agents with more concave utility
functions; the more risk averse. The principal must provide incentives to the agent for him
to invest from the transfer received. For the agent, to invest is to take a risk: forgoing
consumption today so that tomorrow there will be a positive probability that the project is
completed. Agents with higher discount factors are more likely to receive project bonuses:
the more the agent discounts the future, the higher the incentives must be to make him
invest. Aid recipients and managers in more unstable environments require even better
rewards to undertake investment. The projects less valued by the agent, and those projects
with high investment costs and/or small probabilities of success, are more likely to receive
project bonuses.
We ﬁnd that the inability to observe the investment on the part of the principal makes
simultaneous timing the optimal alternative in some circumstances, when sequential timing
would be chosen under observable investment.
Comparing costs and beneﬁts for the two timing alternatives has important implications
in the design of multiple project contracts. We ﬁnd that when technical externalities among
the projects are important, the optimal timing is sequential. And when there are important
value interactions among the projects, simultaneous timing is the principal’s utility maxi-
mizing alternative. When projects are unrelated, we ﬁnd that the optimal contract depends
on the investment costs and valuation considerations of the agent: the optimal contract is
simultaneous for more costly and less valued projects, and sequential for less costly and
more valued projects.
In the foreign aid example, when the principal has special preferences for any of the35
projects, the contract may be ineﬃcient: there may exist an alternative cheaper contract
that provides the agent greater expected value than the alternative that maximizes the
principal’s utility. Foreign aid literature studies the negative eﬀects on the eﬃciency of aid
from donor-driven development. From a theoretical point of view, this is a puzzling situa-
tion: even if the agent is committed to the project and transfers equal to investment funds
are incentive compatible, the principal’s preferences may lead to ineﬃciency. How to pro-
vide appropriate incentives to the principal, perhaps by extending the proposed framework
to account for a richer set of participants in the aid network (governments, multilateral
organizations, NGO’s, etc.) remains open for future research.
In the corporate ﬁnance example, we see that the principal’s ability to set the tim-
ing provides him with additional assurance against the agent’s discretionary use of funds:
shareholders may set their utility maximizing timing in the contract to avoid the manager
maximizing his own utility in the timing decision.
Further, in the corporate ﬁnance example, the ability of the shareholders to decide the
timing of projects works as a protection mechanism: they ensure that the manager follows
the timing that maximizes their beneﬁt instead of the manager’s preferred timing.
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A Appendix: Stationary contract
A.1 One project already completed
At the stationary contract when project X has already been completed, for incentive com-
patibility and promise keeping constraints to be satisﬁed transfer needs to satisfy
u(τ)(1 − β(1 − π)) − u(τ − Ψy)(1 − β) 6 βπy (WXY(1 − β) − wx) (18)
Let ˆ τ b et h es m a l l e s tf e a s i b l et r a n s f e rw h e np r o j e c tX has already been completed. The
cheapest stationary contract when project X is already completed provides the agent a
utility
Sx =
u(˜ τ − Ψy)+wx + βπyWXY
1 − β(1 − πy)
>W x
Let g(τ)=u(τ)(1 − β(1 − π)) − u(τ − Ψy)(1 − β). For g0(τ) > 0, transfer ˜ τ = Ψy is the
cheapest feasible transfer, since for all τ>Ψy we can propose an alternative contract with
s m a l l e rt r a n s f e rt h a ts a t i s ﬁes (18) and is cheaper. For g0(τ) < 0,e i t h e r˜ τ = Ψy is feasible
or (18) binds.
The cost of the cheapest stationary contract when X is completed is given by
Cx =
ˆ τ
[1 − β(1 − πy)]
Claim 4 Cost function is non-increasing with the valuation of the project already completed
Proof. Case 1: γ =0, V 0 > V X. From First Order Conditions and convexity of the






















The cost function is decreasing with the valuation of the completed project. The
optimal contract provides a non-increasing sequence of promised utilities for the successive
unsuccessful attempts until the remaining project is completed.
Case 2: γ>0 In that case, V 0 = V X 6 V. We have an stationary contract from the





Suppose not, suppose transfers at the stationary contract were increasing with the valuation
of the completed project. Let τ(wx) be the cheapest stationary transfer for valuation of
the project already completed wx. For ˆ wx >w x, τ(wx) does satisfy incentive compatibility
constraint for the agent, but we can propose a contract with smaller transfer such that







u(τ(wx) − ε − Ψy)+ ˆ wx + βπyWXY
1 − β(1 − π)
= V X
that satisﬁes promise keeping and incentive compatibility constraint for ˆ wx and is cheaper,
what contradicts transfers increasing with the valuation of the project already completed.
Claim 5 The cost function is increasing in the investment cost and decreasing in the prob-
ability of success.
Proof. To get the eﬀect of changes in investment costs on the cost function, we check
how it aﬀects the constraints of the problem. From the promise keeping constraint, we see
that greater transfers and promises are required when the cost of investment increases, in
order to provide same level of utility.




=( λ + μ)u(τ − Ψy) > 0
so the cost function is increasing in investment cost.





x(V 0) − [μβ + λ](WAB − V 0) < 0
Claim 6 Transfers are non-increasing with the probability of success of the project still to
be completed.
Proof. Let ˆ π>π .When probability of success increases, from (18) smaller transfers
are feasible. For τ to be incentive compatible we need
u(τ) − (WXY(1 − β) − wx) < 040
and change in utility provided to the agent is given by
£
u0(τ)(1 − β(1 − π)) − u0(τ − Ψy)(1 − β)
¤
∆τ
=[ β (WXY(1 − β) − wx) − βu(τ)]∆π
and either g0(τ) > 0 and ∆τ =0 , so transfer is constant at the investment cost and
Sx(ˆ π) >S x(π). Or g0(τ) < 0, Sx(ˆ π) versus Sx(π) depends on the agent’s utility function.
Claim 7 Transfers are non-increasing with the project’s value interactions (WAB)
Proof. Suppose not, suppose ˆ τ(WAB) < ˆ τ( ˆ WAB) for WAB < ˆ WAB. There exist an
alternative contract with τ( ˆ WAB) 6 ˆ τ(WAB) that is feasible and cheaper when value of both
projects completed is ˆ WAB, what contradicts increasing transfers with the value interaction
among the projects.
With respect to the promised utility when a project is already completed, either g0(τ) > 0
and ∆τ =0 , so transfer is constant at the investment cost and Sx( ˆ WAB) >S x(WAB). Or
g0(τ) < 0, Sx( ˆ WAB) versus Sx(WAB) depends on the agent’s utility function.
A.2 Stationary sequential contract
At the stationary sequential contract, the principal chooses the transfer that minimizes




[1 − β(1 − πB)]
s.t. u(τ)(1 − β(1 − πB)) − u(τ − ΨB)(1 − β) 6 βπB(1 − β)SB (21a)
τ > Ψy (21b)
that provides the agent a utility
Sseq =
u(τ∗ − ΨB)+βπBSB
1 − β(1 − πB)
and transfer τ∗ is either τ∗ = Ψy or (21a) binds.
With a parallel reasoning to the preceding section, we ﬁnd that cheapest sequential
transfer, τ∗, is non-increasing with the probability of success and non-decreasing with in-
vestment cost ΨB. Cheapest simultaneous transfer is non-increasing with SB.41
A.3 Stationary simultaneous contract
At the stationary simultaneous contract, the principal chooses the transfer that minimizes
Cab =m i n
τ
[τ + βπ(1 − π)[C∗
B(SB)+C∗
A(SA)]]
[1 − β(1 − π)2]
s.t. u(τ)(1 − β(1 − π)2) − u(τ − ΨAB)(1 − β) 6
6 βπ(1 − β)[πWAB +( 1− π)[SA + SB]] (22a)
u(τ − Ψi)(1 − β(1 − π)2) − u(τ − ΨAB)(1 − β) 6
βπ[π(1 − β(1 − π)π](WAB − Sj)+( 1− π)[1 − β(1 − π)2]Si for i,j=A,B (22b)
τ > ΨAB (22c)
and utility this contract provides to the agent is
Ssim =
u(˜ τ − ΨAB)+βπ(1 − π)(SA + SB)
1 − β(1 − π)2
Transfer ˜ τ is either ˜ τ = ΨAB or (22a) binds.
A.4 Cost comparison
A.4.1 Feasible transfers
To compare the set of incentive compatible transfers for each timing alternative, we compare
gseq(τ)=u(τ)(1 − β(1 − π)) − u(τ − Ψy)(1 − β)
and
gsim(τ)=u(τ)(1 − β(1 − π)2) − u(τ − ΨAB)(1 − β)





u0(τ − ΨAB) − u0(τ − Ψy)
¤
(1 − β)+u0(τ)βπ2 > 0
what implies that whenever g0
sim(τ) > 0,g 0
seq(τ) > 0, transfers equal to investment costs
are feasible in both timings. Whenever g0
seq(τ) < 0, we have that g0
sim(τ) < 0 and is feasible
to have sequential transfer greater than the simultaneous.
Whenever (22b) binds and τ∗ > ΨAB,w eﬁnd that ˜ τ<τ ∗ since at ˜ τ sequential contract
is not feasible (the agent prefers to invest on both projects than in the ﬁrst project in the
sequence).
We need to consider, for τ∗ > ΨAB, four cases for the transfer comparison with respect
to (22a):42
1. (22a) does not bind and g0
sim(τ) > 0. Transfers equal to investment costs are feasible
in both timings, so sequential contract is the cheapest alternative.
2. (22a) does bind and g0
sim(τ) > 0. Transfers equal to investment costs are feasible in
both timings, so sequential contract is the cheapest alternative
3. (22a) does bind and g0
sim(τ) < 0. Let
T seq(τ)=u(τ)(1 − β(1 − πB)) − u(τ − ΨB)(1 − β)
−βπB(1 − β)SB 6 0
Tsim(τ)=u(τ)(1 − β(1 − π)2) − u(τ − ΨAB)(1 − β)
−βπ(1 − β)[πWAB +( 1− π)[SA + SB]] 6 0
When Tsim(˜ τ)=0and so (22a) binds, we have that
T seq(˜ τ)=u(τ)βπ(1 − π) −
£
u0(τ − ΨB)(ΨAB − ΨB)
¤
(1 − β)
−βπ(1 − β)[π(SB − WAB) − (1 − π)SA]
for small (ΨAB−ΨB) we have that T seq(˜ τ) > 0.I fg0
seq(τ) < 0, we have that ˜ τ<τ ∗. If
g0
seq(τ) > 0, we would have that transfer in the sequential case would equal investment
cost, and so contracts would not be comparable.
4. (22a) does not bind, and g0
sim(τ) < 0 and (21a) does bind with a transfer τ∗ > ΨAB.
Then by the symmetric argument we have that Tsim(τ∗) < 0, and since g0
sim(τ) < 0
we have that ˜ τ<τ ∗.
Whenever neither (22a) nor (21a) bind, transfers are equal to investment cost in both
cases and we are not in the set of contracts we can compare.
A.4.2 Cost functions
The diﬀerence of the costs for the simultaneous and sequential timing is given by
Cab − CA_B =[ τ∗ − ˜ τ](1− β(1 − π)) + τ∗βπ(1 − π)
+(1 − β(1 − π))βπCx
Simultaneous contract is cheaper when
[˜ τ − τ∗] <C xβπ(2 − π)43
Under full information, we have that sequential contract is the cost minimizing alternative.
With moral hazard, the optimal timing depends on the need to provide incentives to the
agent: when agent’s valuation of the projects is small, or when they are relatively costly
and probability of success is small, transfers need to be over the investment cost. The fact
that in a simultaneous contract expected returns to investment are higher, and that partly
compensates the agent for the risk he is undertaking, can make the simultaneous contract
the cost minimizing alternative.
B Appendix: Cost function properties
Lemma 6 The cost function when project x has already been completed, C∗
x ,is increasing,
convex and diﬀerentiable.
Proof. (a) Increasing. Let (τ,V0) be the optimal contract that provides V level of
utility. We want to show that C∗(V ) <C ∗(˜ V ) for all V<˜ V.
To provide V = ˆ V − ε, the optimal contract needs to satisfy the promise keeping con-
straint for the new utility to be provided.
(ˆ V − V )=ε = u0(τ − Ψ)∆τ + β(1 − π)∆V 0
and for the incentive compatibility constraint to be satisﬁed we need that
£
u0(τ) − u0(τ − Ψ)
¤
∆τ 6 −βπ∆V 0
Let’s set ∆V 0 =0 . To satisfy the two constraints, change in transfer has to satisfy
£
u0(τ) − u0(τ − Ψ)
¤
∆τ 6 0
ε = u0(τ − Ψ)∆τ
The contract (τ − ∆τ,V0) is feasible and incentive compatible when the level of utility to
be provided is V , but it may not be optimal. This implies
C∗
x(V ) 6 C∗





(b) Convexity. Let (τ1,V0
1) and (τ2,V0
2) be the optimal contracts for V1 and V2 respec-
tively.
From concavity of the utility function, we know that τ<λ τ (V1)+(1−λ)τ(V2) is feasible
when the level of utility to be provided is (λV1+(1−λ)V2) keeping constant promised utilities44
in case of failure. This transfer is also Incentive Compatible. Comparing the cost functions
we get
C∗
x(λV1 +( 1− λ)V2) 6 λC∗
x(V1)+( 1− λ)C∗
x(V2)−




(c) To show that C∗ is diﬀerentiable, we apply Benveniste-Scheinkman (1978). Deﬁne
C∗
x(V0)=τ(V 0(V0),V 0)+β(1 − π)Cx(V 0(V0))
W(V )=τ(V 0(V0),V)+β(1 − π)C(V 0(V0))
where τ(V 0(V0),V) is the transfer that satisﬁes promise keeping and IC for a V level of




x(V ) 6 W(V ) for V in a neighborhood of V0
C∗ is a convex function, and W is a diﬀerentiable function. From Benveniste-Scheinkman










Lemma 7 The cost function of the sequential contract that starts with project B, C∗
B_A ,is
increasing, convex and diﬀerentiable.
Proof. The T operator is a contraction on the complete metric space of continuous,
increasing and convex functions, so it has a ﬁxed point. This ﬁxed point is an increasing
and convex function by the symmetric argument used in Lemma 1.




B(V0),V 0)+β(1 − π)C∗













B(V0),V) is the transfer that satisﬁes promise keeping and IC for a V level
of utility to be provided when promise in case of failure is ﬁxed at V 0(V0) and promise in
case of success is ﬁxed at V
0




B_A(V ) 6 W(V ) for V in a neighborhood of V045
Wi sad i ﬀerentiable function. C∗












Lemma 8 The cost function of the simultaneous contract. C∗
ab ,is increasing, convex and
diﬀerentiable.
Proof. The T operator is a contraction on the complete metric space of continuous and
increasing functions, so it has a ﬁxed point. The ﬁxed point is an increasing and concave
function.
To show that C∗
































where τ(V 0(V0),V) is the transfer that satisﬁes promise keeping and IC for a V level of
utility to be provided when promise in case of failure is ﬁxed at V 0(V0) and promise in case
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C Appendix: Sequential contract characteristics
Proposition 10 At the cheapest stationary contract, a project bonus upon completion of





Proof. From the First Order Conditions of the stationary sequential contract, we know
that constraint (8a) must bind whenever the optimal contract diﬀers from (ΨB,VB).T h e



























[1 − β(1 − πB)]u0(τ) − (1 − β)u0(τ − ΨB)
−βπB(1 − β)




















for the First Order Conditions to be satisﬁed, so γB > 0 and V
0
B = V B and no project
b o n u si sp r o v i d e d .
A necessary condition for γB =0 , V
0














The candidate agents to get project bonuses are the ones with more concave utility functions.
Claim 8 As the value interaction among projects increases, the optimal contract provides
non-increasing transfers.
Proof. We proceed in two steps: we ﬁr s td e r i v et h ee ﬀect of the value interaction, WAB,
on the cost of promised utility when B is completed, and second we derive how this aﬀects
the transfer and promises at the optimal (stationary) sequential contract.
(1) Since eﬀect of value interactions comes from the cost of the promise when the ﬁrst
project is completed, we start with the eﬀect of the value interactions on the cost of promised47
utility when project B is completed. The transfer when B has already been completed is
non-increasing in WAB. Suppose not. Let τ be the optimal transfer to be provided when
the value of both projects completed is WAB. For ˆ WAB >W AB, τ is feasible (incentive
compatibility and promise keeping are satisﬁed with this transfer) and there may be a
cheaper transfer ˆ τ 6 τ. So transfer when B is already completed is non-increasing in WAB.
Cost of promised utility becomes smaller as value interaction increases.
Let (τ,V0
B) be the optimal contract for valuation of both projects completed WAB.
(2a) When ˆ WAB >W AB implies V B( ˆ WAB) >VB(WAB). We want to show that optimal
sequential transfer is non-increasing in WAB. Suppose not.
If V 0
B = V B(WAB), for ˆ WAB the new contract must provide ˆ V 0
B > V B( ˆ WAB) >
V B(WAB). The contract (τ,VB( ˆ WAB)) satisﬁes the incentive compatibility and promise
keeping constraints when the value interaction is given by ˆ WAB, but we can propose an
alternative contract with smaller transfers that is feasible, which contradicts increasing
transfers in the valuation of both projects completed.
If V 0
B >V B(WAB), we can either have V 0
B >V B( ˆ WAB), where contract for WAB is
feasible for ˆ WAB but we can ﬁnd a cheaper alternative contract with no greater transfers.
Or we can have V B( ˆ WAB) >V0
B >VB(WAB), and the argument would be symmetric to
the V 0
B = V B(WAB) case.
(2b) When ˆ WAB >W AB implies V B( ˆ WAB) <VB(WAB). All contracts feasible for WAB
a r ea l s of e a s i b l ef o r ˆ WAB, and we can propose alternative contracts with smaller transfers
and greater promises incentive compatible and promise keeping and cheaper, since cost of
promise in case of success became smaller, which contradicts increasing transfers with size
of the value interaction.
D Appendix: Simultaneous contract characteristics
Proposition 11 At the cheapest simultaneous contract for technically symmetric projects,
a project bonus is provided to agents with absolute risk aversion
r(τ) >
βπ(1 − π)
[1 − β(1 − π)](ΨAB − Ψ)
(25)
Proof. In the cheapest simultaneous contract, which we showed in Proposition 4 to be
stationary, two incentive compatibility constraints need to be taken into account. When
the promise keeping (12a) constraint is plugged into the incentive compatibility constraints48
(12c) and (12d) we get
u(τ − Ψ)(1 − β(1 − π)2) − u(τ − ΨAB)(1 − β(1 − π)) >
> βπ(1 − β(1 − π))
£
π(WAB − V 0
B)+( 1− π)V 0
A
¤
u(τ − Ψ)(1 − β(1 − π)2) − u(τ − ΨAB)(1 − β(1 − π)) >
> βπ(1 − β(1 − π))
£
π(WAB − V 0
A)+( 1− π)V 0
B
¤
and the problem the principal solves to get the cheaper contract is:
















[1 − β(1 − π)2]
s.t. ICA(μ1),IC B(μ2) (26)
V 0
B > V B (γB),V0
A > V A (γA) (27)
where (27) comes from the optimal contract when only project A or B are completed
respectively, as do the cost functions C∗
A(.) and C∗










= γA + μ1 [βπ(1 − β(1 − π))] − (μ2 + μ1)
£











= γB + μ2 [βπ(1 − β(1 − π))] − (μ2 + μ1)
£
βπ2(1 − β(1 − π))
¤
We check for all possible combinations of constraints binding.





B. The principal’s problem becomes:
C(V )=m i n
τ,V0










[1 − β(1 − π)2]
s.t. u(τ − Ψ)(1 − β(1 − π)2) − u(τ − ΨAB)(1 − β(1 − π)) = (30a)
= βπ(1 − β(1 − π))
£




c > max(V A ,VB)( γ) (30b)
where V 0
c denotes promised utility when one of the projects has been completed. When we






























u0(τ − Ψ)(1 − β(1 − π)2) − u0(τ − ΨAB)(1 − β(1 − π))
−βπ(1 − β(1 − π))(1 − 2π)
From these two equations we get that γ>0 is only feasible if dV 0
dτ > 0. This means that
V 0 =m a x ( V A ,VB) and since projects are symmetric no project receives a project bonus.
We can have γ =0, so bonus in both projects is feasible, when dV 0




[1 − β(1 − π)](ΨAB − Ψ)




[1 − β(1 − π)](ΨAB − Ψ)
and (1 − 2π) > 0
we can propose an alternative contract with smaller promises for more valued project and
greater promises for less valued projects that is cheaper, and where one of the projects does
not get a bonus that is cheaper, which contradicts optimally of bonus for both projects.
( i i )T a k et h ec a s ew h e r eμ1 =0and μ2 > 0 From (28) we get that γA > 0 which implies
V 0























1 − β(1 − π)2¤






[1 − β(1 − π)](ΨAB − Ψ)
and a symmetric argument applies for μ1 > 0 and μ2 =0 .
(iii) Suppose μ1 = μ2 =0 . Then for First Order Conditions to be satisﬁed we need
γA > 0,γB > 0, and no project gets a project bonus.
Proposition 12 In the simultaneous cheapest contract with technically symmetric projects,
either no project bonus is promised, or if there is a project bonus it is greater for the less
valued project.50
Proof. We need to consider four cases, for the four possible combinations of project
bonus in each of the two projects. These cases are given by the binding and not binding of
the feasibility constraints V
0
A > V A and V
0
B > V B. From the cost minimization problem,
λ0,λ A and λB are the Lagrange multipliers for the incentive compatibility constraints (12b),
(12c) and (12d), and μ is the multiplier for the promise keeping constraint (12a).
1. Both projects get project bonus, i.e. none of the constraints binds, V
0
A >V A and
V
0
B >VB. We showed that in the stationary contract this can only be the case when








B > max(V B ,VA).
So greater bonuses are given for the less valued project.
2. γ1 =0 ,γ2 > 0.V
0
A = V A, project A does not get a project bonus.
We consider four cases:
(i) incentive compatibility constraint for project B binds, so λA =0 ,λ B > 0. This
implies V
0
A = V A 6 V
0











If WA >W B,w eh a v eWB <W A <VA <V
0
B , so a positive bonus is given when the
less valued project is completed.
If WA <W B,VA <VB. From the First Order Conditions and convexity of the cost


















what leads to a contradiction since it implies V
0
B <VB .
(ii) incentive compatibility for project A binds, λA > 0,λ B =0 . This implies V
0
A =
V A > V
0
B.




























If WA >W B, we have a positive bonus for the less valued project.
If WA <W B, we have V 0
B <VA <VB, which contradicts feasibility.51
(iii) λA =0 ,λ B =0 . incentive compatibility A and incentive compatibility B may or
may not be binding. We will go to points 1 or 2 depending on the situation.
(iv) Both incentive compatibility constraints bind, λA > 0,λ B > 0 If both constraints




A. The relative magnitude of the multipliers brings us to
the previous cases.
3. γ1 > 0,γ2 =0 , no project bonus for project B. Symmetric to (2).
In that case we ﬁnd λA > 0,λ B =0 ,V0
A >VB when WA <W B .O rλA =0 ,λ B >
0,V0
A <VB when WA <W B
4. Neither project gets a bonus, γ1 > 0,γ2 > 0
Both constraints are binding, so no bonus promised utility is provided in any situation.
Proposition 13 In the simultaneous contract, when the two projects have diﬀerent invest-
ment costs, we can have project bonus for the more valued project when this project is the
one with greater investment cost.
Proof. We consider the case ΨA > ΨB. We need to check the incentive compatibility
constraints in this new situation:
if βπV
0
A − u(τ − ΨB)=βπV
0







u(τ − ΨB) − u(τ − ΨA)
βπ
¸







u(τ − ΨB) − u(τ − ΨA)
βπ
¸




u(τ − ΨB) − u(τ − ΨA)
βπ
¸
We need again to consider the four possible cases:
1. Both projects get project bonus, neither V
0
A > V A and V
0
B > V B bind. We can mimic
the argument of the symmetric costs case and ﬁnd that one of them needs to bind at
V sim.
2. γ1 =0 ,γ2 > 0,V
0
A = V A, project A does not get project bonus.
We need to consider four cases:52
(i) λA =0 ,λ B > 0. Incentive compatibility for project B binds. This implies
(V A − V
0
B) <γ











If WA >W B,w eh a v eWB <W A <VA <V
0
B to satisfy both incentive compatibility
and promise keeping constraints. Positive bonus when less valued project is completed.
If WA <W B,VA <VB. From convexity of the cost function with respect to the value


















what leads to a contradiction since it implies V
0
B <VB and that is not feasible.
(ii) λA > 0,λ B =0 .Incentive compatibility for project A binds. This implies
(V A − V
0
B) >γ






















If WA <W B,w eh a v eV
0
B <VA <VB what is not feasible.
If WA >W B, we have bonus when less valued project is completed.
(iii) λA =0 ,λ B =0 . incentive compatibility A and incentive compatibility B may or
may not be binding. We go to points 1 and 2 depending on the situation.
(iv) λA > 0,λ B > 0 If both incentive compatibility constraints are binding, we need
(V A − V B)=γ.
3. γ1 > 0,γ2 =0 ,V
0
B = V B. Project B does not get project bonus.
We need to consider four cases:
(i) λA =0 ,λ B > 0. Incentive compatibility constraint for project B binds. This
implies
(V 0
A − V B) <γ53




















If WA >W B,w eh a v eo rV 0
A <VB <VA, that is a contradiction. Or we have positive
bonus when the project more valued that requires a greater cost of investment is
completed.
If WA <W B, we have positive bonus when less valued project is completed.
(ii) λA > 0,λ B =0 . Incentive compatibility constraint for project A binds. This
implies
(V 0
A − V B) >γ
























what leads to a contradiction.
If WA <W B we have positive bonus when less valued project is completed.
(iii) λA =0 ,λ B =0 . incentive compatibility A and incentive compatibility B may or
may not be binding. We will go to points 1 and 2 depending on the situation.
(iv) λA > 0,λ B > 0. Both incentive compatibility constraints are binding. Depending
on the relative magnitude of the multipliers, we are in situation (1) or (2).
4. γ1 > 0,γ2 > 0, no bonus for any project.
Both constraints are binding, so no bonus promised utility is provided in any situation.
Proposition 14 In the simultaneous contract, when the projects have diﬀerent probabilities
of success, we can have that the more valued project gets project bonus if this project is the
one with smaller probability of success.54





























=( 1− β)λB − βλA + γ2
And from the incentive compatibility constraints we get
if πA(V 0
B − V 0
A)=−(πA − πB)(V 0
A − V 0) both constraints bind simultaneously
if πA(V 0
B − V 0
A) < −(πA − πB)(V 0
A − V 0) ICA binds and ICB does not bind
if πA(V 0
B − V 0
A) > −(πA − πB)(V 0
A − V 0) ICB binds and ICA does not bind
We need to consider four cases:
1. Both projects get project bonus, neither V
0
A > V A and V
0
B > V B bind. We mimic the
argument of the symmetric probabilities case and ﬁnd that one of them needs to bind
at V sim.
2. No bonus for project A. γ1 =0 ,γ2 > 0,V
0
A = V A
We need to consider four cases:
(i) Incentive compatibility constrain for project B binds, λA =0 ,λ B > 0. This implies
πA(V 0
B − V A) > −(πA − πB)(V A − V 0)











If WA >W B, we have positive bonus when less valued project is completed.
If WA <W B,VA <VB. To be feasible we need V A <V
0
B, and we give bonus to the
more valued project when it is the one with smaller success probability.
(ii) Incentive compatibility for project A binds, λA > 0,λ B =0 . This implies
πA(V 0
B − V A) < −(πA − πB)(V A − V 0)
V 0
B <V A55






















If WA <W B,w eh a v eV
0
B <VA <VB what is a contradiction.
If WA >W B, we have bonus when less valued project is completed.
(iii) λA =0 ,λ B =0 . incentive compatibility A and incentive compatibility B may or
may not be binding. We go to points 1 and 2 depending on the situation.
(iv) λA > 0,λ B > 0 If both constraints are binding, we need (V A − V B)=γ.
3. No bonus for project B, γ1 > 0,γ2 =0 ,V
0
B = V B
We need to consider four cases:
(i) Incentive compatibility for project B binds, λA =0 ,λ B > 0. This implies
πA(V B − V 0
A) > −(πA − πB)(V 0
A − V 0)




















If WA >W B,w eh a v eo rV 0
A <VB <VA, that is a contradiction. Or we have project
bonus for the more valued project that has a smaller probability of success.
If WA <W B, we have positive bonus when less valued project is completed.
(ii) Incentive compatibility constraint for project A binds, λA > 0,λ B =0 . This
implies
πA(V B − V 0
A) < −(πA − πB)(V 0
A − V 0)
V B <V 0
A
























what leads to a contradiction.
If WA <W B we have positive bonus when less valued project is completed.
(iii) λA =0 ,λ B =0 . incentive compatibility A and incentive compatibility B may or
may not be binding. We will go to points 1 and 2 depending on the situation.
(iv) λA > 0,λ B > 0. Both constraints are binding. Depending on the relative magni-
tude of the multipliers, we are in situation (1) or (2).
4. γ1 > 0,γ2 > 0
Both constraints are binding, so no bonus promised utility is provided in any situation.
E Appendix: Cost comparison
Proposition 15 For technically symmetric projects (i.e.πA = πB,ΨA = ΨB),w h e nt r a n s -
fers of the cheapest sequential contract are such that simultaneous investment is feasible,
i.e. τseq > ΨAB, simultaneous contract is cheaper.
Proof. Without loss of generality suppose WA 6 WB. By Lemma 3 optimal sequential
contract starts with project B. Let (τ,V0,V
0
B) be the cheapest (and by Proposition 2 station-
ary) sequential contract that provides utility V seq t ot h ea g e n ta n di ss u c ht h a tτ > ΨAB.
We want to compare it with the cheapest simultaneous contract for same promised utility
level V seq.
We deﬁne a simultaneous contract (˜ τ, ˜ V 0, ˜ V 0
B, ˜ V 0
A) with ˜ τ = τ, ˜ V 0 = V 0 and ˜ VB = V 0
B that
provides the agent a utility ¯ V > V seq.W es e t˜ V 0
A so that the contract (τ,V0,V0
B, ˜ V 0
A) satisﬁes
promise keeping and incentive compatibility constraints of the simultaneous contract. Since
τ > ΨAB, this transfer is feasible in a simultaneous contract. From the promise keeping




π2WAB +( 1− π)2V 0 + π(1 − π)˜ V 0
A + π(1 − π)V 0
B
i
= u(τ − Ψ)+β
h
π˜ V 0
B +( 1− π)˜ V 0t
i
[u(τ − Ψ) − u(τ − ΨAB)] = β
h
π2(WAB − V 0
B)+π(1 − π)(˜ V 0




u(τ − Ψ) − u(τ − ΨAB)
βπ(1 − π)
−
π2(WAB − V 0
B) − π(1 − π)V 0
π(1 − π)
(31)57
From the incentive compatibility constraint of the sequential contract we have that
u(τ − ΨAB)+β
£




6 u(τ − Ψ)+β
£
πV 0
B +( 1− π)V 0¤
since sequential transfer is greater than cost of investment in both projects simultaneously
and the sequential contract aims to provide incentives to the agent to invest only on project
B, the ﬁrst project in the sequence. Together (31) and (32) imply ˜ V 0
A > V A.




A +( 1− π)V 0
i
6
6 u(τ − ΨAB)+β
h
π2WAB +( 1− π)2V 0 + π(1 − π)˜ V 0







B +( 1− π)V 0¤
6
6 u(τ − ΨAB)+β
h
π2WAB +( 1− π)2V 0 + π(1 − π)˜ V 0





6 u(τ − ΨAB)+β
h
π2WAB +( 1− π)2V 0 + π(1 − π)˜ V 0




Incentive compatibility (35) is satisﬁed by construction of the contract (τ,V0,V0
B, ˜ V 0
A). In-
centive compatibility (34) is binding by construction of ˜ V 0
A. For (33) to be satisﬁed, we need
to ensure that ˜ V 0
A 6 V 0
B. For this to hold we need
˜ V 0
A − VB =

















− βπ(1 − π)[V 0
B − V 0]
βπ(1 − π)
=








+( 1− π)[V 0











(1 + βπ(1 − π))
=








+( 1− π)[V 0




what implies ˜ V 0
A = V 0
B and (33) also binds.
Let C∗
B_A(V seq) and C∗
ab(V seq) be the minimum cost to provide the agent utility V seq
in a sequential and simultaneous contract respectively, and let Cab(¯ V ) be the cost of the58
simultaneous contract (τ,V0,V0
B, ˜ V 0
A) that provides the agent a utility ¯ V > V seq.B yP r o p o -
sition 2 the optimal sequential contract is stationary, so V 0 = V seq. The diﬀerence in cost
of each timing structure is given by
C∗
B_A(V seq) − C∗
ab(V seq) > C∗
B_A(V seq) − Cab(V seq)
> C∗










A)+( 1− π)2Cab(V 0)
i
= β(1 − π)
h
C∗












Rearranging terms, we obtain
(1 − β(1 − π))
h
C∗
















Since WA 6 WB and ˜ V 0
A = V 0

























1 − β(1 − π)







1 − β(1 − π)
> 0
since
Φ(π)=−1+2 π(2 − π) − (2πβ − 1)(1 − π)2 > 0 for all π ∈ [0,1]
what implies
C∗
B_A(V seq) >C ∗
ab(V seq)
hence a sequential contract is more expensive than the simultaneous one.